UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE DIRECTOR OF THE
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

In the Matter of:	)	
	)	
Alistair K. Chan,	)	Proceeding No. D2025-28
	)	
Respondent.	)	
	)	

FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 11.24

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24, Alistair K. Chan ("Respondent") is hereby suspended for sixty (60) days from the practice of patent, trademark, and other non-patent law before the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO" or "Office"), for violation of 37 C.F.R. § 11.804(h), having been disciplined by a duly constituted authority of a State.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent has been registered to practice in patent matters before the USPTO. Respondent's USPTO Registration Number is 44,603. Respondent is subject to the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct set forth at 37 C.F.R. § 11.101 *et seq.*

2. The Director of the USPTO has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2)(D) and 32, and 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.19 and 11.24.

State Disciplinary Proceedings

3. By Order dated June 4, 2025, in *In re Alistair Chan*, WSBA No. 55568, 202263-4 ("June 4, 2025 Order"), the Supreme Court of Washington suspended Respondent from the practice of law in that jurisdiction for sixty (60) days on ethical grounds and placed him on probation for twenty-four (24) months beginning on the date of Respondent's reinstatement. *See*

Complaint, Att. 1, Ex. A of October 31, 2025 and December 18, 2025 Notice and Order Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24.

4. The June 4, 2025 Order was based on a Stipulation to Suspension entered by Respondent and the Washington State Bar Association ("Stipulation") regarding his representation of a patent applicant before the USPTO, wherein Respondent acknowledged that he understood that he was entitled to a hearing, to present exhibits and witnesses on his behalf, and to have a hearing officer determine the facts, misconduct and sanction in the case, but he chose to resolve the proceeding by entering into the Stipulation. Stipulation 1-2. *See* Complaint, Att. 1, Ex. B of October 31, 2025 and December 18, 2025 Notice and Order Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24.

5. Respondent admitted a series of facts and stipulated to a series of misconduct. In particular, Respondent admitted that he: (1) failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, Robert Saccomanno, in violation of Washington State Rule of Professional Conduct ("RPC") 1.3; (2) failed to keep Mr. Saccomanno reasonably informed about the status of Mr. Saccomanno's matter and failed to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of RPC 1.4(a) and (b); and (3) failed to give reasonable notice regarding termination of the representation and promptly refund unearned fees in violation to RPC 1.16(d). Stipulation, at 4 ¶¶ 18-20.

6. Respondent further stipulated to the 60-day suspension and the terms of probation. Stipulation, at 6 ¶¶ 30-37.

7. Respondent's discipline was determined based upon consideration of multiple mitigating factors including Respondent's "personal or emotional problems." Stipulation, at 6 ¶ 28.

8. Respondent had the opportunity to consult independent legal counsel and entered into the Stipulation voluntarily. Stipulation, at 9 ¶ 36.

USPTO Reciprocal Discipline Proceeding

9. On October 31, 2025, a "Notice and Order Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24" ("October Notice and Order"), was sent by certified mail (receipt no. 7021 2720 0002 1229 1121), notifying Respondent that the Director of the Office of Enrollment and Discipline ("OED Director") had filed a "Complaint for Reciprocal Discipline Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24" ("Complaint") requesting that the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office impose reciprocal discipline upon Respondent using the procedures set forth in § 11.24 for violating 37 C.F.R. § 11.804(h), by being disciplined on ethical grounds by a duly constituted authority of a State, predicated on the June 4, 2025 Order, suspending Respondent from the practice of law in that jurisdiction for sixty (60) days on ethical grounds.

10. The October Notice and Order provided Respondent an opportunity to file, within forty (40) days, a response opposing the imposition of reciprocal discipline identical to that imposed the June 4, 2025 Order, based on one or more of the reasons provided in 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1).

11. The October Notice and Order was mailed by first-class certified mail, return receipt requested to an address in Bainbridge Island, Washington that was provided by Respondent to the Office of Enrollment and Discipline pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.11(a). However, the October Notice and Order was returned unopened with the explanation that it was "Not Deliverable as Addressed" and "Unable to Forward."

12. On November 7, 2025, Respondent sent the OED Director correspondence which specifically referenced the "Request for Notice and Order of October 24, 2025." While not

explicitly so stating, this correspondence appeared to challenge the imposition of reciprocal discipline. However, it appeared to be filed in response to the OED Director's Request for Notice and Order of October 24, 2025 since the October Notice and Order was not successfully delivered to Respondent.

13. On December 18, 2025, a second copy of the "Notice and Order Pursuant 37 C.F.R. § 11.24" ("December Notice and Order") was mailed to Respondent. The December 18, 2025 Notice and Order was mailed both by first-class certified mail, return receipt requested (receipt no. 7021 2720 0002 1229 1145) and regular first-class mail to the address in Bainbridge Island, Washington. The December Notice and Order was successfully delivered to the Respondent on December 22, 2025. Respondent was afforded forty (40) days to file a response.

14. The December Notice and Order included a request for Respondent to communicate if he desired to have his November 7, 2025 correspondence sent to the OED Director serve as his response to the December Notice and Order.

15. On January 8, 2026, Respondent sent to the OED Director, but not the USPTO Director as directed in the December Notice and Order, a copy of his November 7, 2025 correspondence and described it as his "Response to the RFI for proceeding D2025-28" ("Response"). In his correspondence, Respondent states that he did not believe the client's grievance was valid because his duty to the client had ended when the rectification was denied and the client retained other counsel. Response, at 3. He also requests that the mitigating circumstances related to his wife's illness be considered. *Id.* Respondent has not filed or served any other document in response to the October Notice and Order or December Notice and Order.

16. Although the Response was not filed directly with the USPTO Director as ordered in the December Notice and Order, in the interest of fairness, the response was accepted as a

timely and proper filing.

17. In accordance with a Briefing Order issued on March 18, 2026, the OED Director timely filed on April 30, 2026 the "OED Director's Response to Respondent's Response to Notice and Order Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24" ("OED Response"). In that pleading, the OED Director argues Respondent's mitigating factors and factual assertions related to his wife's illness and his interactions with his client were already considered in the Washington proceeding, and that these do not show by clear and convincing evidence that there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to any of the factors set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1). OED Response, at 6.

18. Respondent did not file a Reply that was permitted under the March 18, 2026 Briefing Order.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Reciprocal disciplinary proceedings are not in any sense *de novo* proceedings. *See In re Barach*, 540 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2008); *In re Surrick*, 338 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2003). Rather, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d), and in accordance with *Selling v. Radford*, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), the USPTO has codified standards for imposing reciprocal discipline based on a state's disciplinary adjudication. Pursuant to *Selling*, state disbarment creates a federal-level presumption that imposition of reciprocal discipline is proper, unless an independent review of the record reveals: (1) a want of due process; (2) an infirmity of proof of the misconduct; or (3) that grave injustice would result from the imposition of reciprocal discipline. 243 U.S. at 51. Federal courts have generally "concluded that in reciprocal discipline cases, it is the respondent attorney's burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the *Selling* elements precludes reciprocal discipline." *In re Kramer,* 282 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2002); *In re*

Friedman, 51 F.3d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1995). "This standard is narrow, for '[a Federal court, or here the USPTO Director is] not sitting as a court of review to discover error in the [hearing judge's] or the [state] courts' proceedings.'" *In re Zdravkovich*, 634 F.3d 574, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting *In re Sibley*, 564 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).

The USPTO's regulation governing reciprocal discipline, 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1), mirrors the *Selling* standard:

> [T]he USPTO Director shall consider the record and shall impose the identical public censure, public reprimand, probation, disbarment, suspension, or disciplinary disqualification unless the practitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence, and the USPTO Director finds there is a genuine issue of material fact that:
>
> (i) The procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute deprivation of due process;
> (ii) There was such infirmity of proof establishing the conduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Office could not, consistently with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject;
> (iii) The imposition of the same public censure, public reprimand, probation, disbarment, suspension or disciplinary disqualification by the Office would result in a grave injustice; or
> (iv) Any argument that the practitioner was not publicly censured, publicly reprimanded, placed on probation, disbarred, suspended or disciplinarily disqualified.

Id.

To prevent the imposition of reciprocal discipline, Respondent is required to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to one of these criteria by clear and convincing evidence. *See id.* As discussed below, however, Respondent has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to any of the factors set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1).

III. ANALYSIS

Respondent's submissions do not establish any basis to avoid reciprocal discipline under § 11.24(d)(1). As discussed below, Respondent does not meaningfully address the governing standards under 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1). He does not identify any procedural defect in the Washington proceeding, demonstrate any infirmity in the proof supporting the disciplinary order, nor show that imposing reciprocal suspension would result in a grave injustice.

A. Respondent Did Not Suffer a Deprivation of Due Process

Under 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1)(i), the Director may decline to impose reciprocal discipline only if the practitioner clearly and convincingly demonstrates that the prior disciplinary proceeding lacked notice or an opportunity to be heard so as to constitute a deprivation of due process. Respondent has not made that showing.

Due process in disciplinary matters requires notice reasonably calculated to inform the respondent of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. *See In re Faro*, Proceeding No. D2019-09, at 9-10 (USPTO Feb. 21, 2020). The record reflects that the Washington State disciplinary proceedings afforded Respondent notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In the Stipulation, Respondent acknowledged that he was entitled to a hearing, to present witnesses and exhibits, and to have a hearing officer determine the facts, misconduct, and sanction. Stipulation, at 1. He further acknowledged that he could have pursued a hearing and appeal, but elected instead to enter into the stipulation to avoid the risk, time, and expense of further proceedings. *Id.* at 1-2. Respondent also was afforded the opportunity to consult independent legal counsel before entering into the Stipulation. *Id.* at 9

Respondent's disagreement with the underlying grievance or his reliance on mitigating facts does not establish a due process violation. Reciprocal discipline proceedings are not *de novo* proceedings and are not a vehicle for retrying the original case. *See In re Rheinstein*,

Proceeding No. D2021-06, at 13 (USPTO July 22, 2022) (reciprocal disciplinary proceedings are not in any sense *de novo* proceedings); *In re Khaliq*, Proceeding No. D2020-28, at 13 (USPTO Mar. 31, 2021); *In re Williams*, 398 F.3d 116, 118 (1st Cir. 2005) (A "state court's substantive findings ordinarily are entitled to a high degree of respect when this court is asked to impose reciprocal discipline."). "A proceeding designed to weigh the advisability of reciprocal discipline is not a vehicle for retrying the original disciplinary proceeding." *In re Barach*, 540 F.3d at 87; *In re Nace*, Proceeding No. D2015-03, at 14-15 (USPTO Sept. 8, 2015) ("Reciprocal discipline proceedings are not...venues for rearguing the original foreign discipline."). Accordingly, the process afforded in Washington, as acknowledged and agreed to in the Stipulation, satisfied due process. Respondent's attempts to relitigate the substance of the Washington matter, including arguments concerning his wife's illness and his client's change of counsel, do not establish a deprivation of due process and do not provide a basis to avoid reciprocal discipline.

The record therefore does not support a finding that the Washington proceedings were so lacking in due process as to make reciprocal discipline improper.

B. Respondent Has Not Established an Infirmity of Proof in the Washington Proceedings

Respondent likewise has not shown an infirmity of proof under 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1)(ii). To satisfy this exception, Respondent must show by clear and convincing evidence that there was such an infirmity of proof in the Washington proceedings that the USPTO should not accept the underlying discipline. *See In re Lindon*, Proceeding No. D2018-39, at 7-8 (USPTO Nov. 19, 2019). He has not done so.

Here, Respondent's challenge to the client's grievance rests primarily on his belief that his duty to the client ended when the rectification was denied and the client retained new

counsel. Response, at 3. That position was already included in the Stipulation. Stipulation, at 3 ¶ 14. Respondent has not identified a hidden defect in the evidence, but rather he is attempting to relitigate an issue he already admitted and resolved through agreement. The Washington discipline was based on Respondent's own admissions, and those admissions were sufficient to support the discipline imposed. Respondent's present dissatisfaction with the result does not establish a genuine issue of material fact, much less clear and convincing evidence of an infirmity of proof.

The record therefore does not support a finding that the Washington proceedings were so lacking in proof as to make reciprocal discipline improper.

C. Imposition of a Reciprocal Suspension Would Not Result in a Grave Injustice under 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1)(iii).

Respondent also has not shown that imposing reciprocal suspension would result in a grave injustice under 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d)(1)(iii). Although Respondent frames his argument in terms of mitigation, his position essentially is that his wife's illness and related personal circumstances should reduce the sanction. The record shows, however, that those circumstances were already considered in the Washington proceeding.

As the OED Director notes, the grave injustice analysis focuses on whether the severity of the punishment "fits" the misconduct and allows for consideration of various mitigating factors. *See In re Thav*, 852 F. Supp. 2d 857, 861-62 (E.D. Mich. 2012); *see also In re Kramer*, 282 F.3d at 727 (on challenge to imposition of reciprocal discipline, "we inquire only whether the punishment imposed by [the first] court was so ill-fitted to an attorney's adjudicated misconduct that reciprocal disbarment would result in grave injustice"); *In re Attorney Discipline Matter*, 98 F.3d 1082, 1088 (8th Cir. 1996) (no grave injustice where disbarment imposed by the

state court "was within the appropriate range of sanctions"); *In re Benjamin*, 870 F. Supp. 41, 44 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (public censure within range of penalties for misconduct and thus censure was not a grave injustice). "As long as the discipline from the state bar was within the range of appropriate sanctions, it is not grave injustice for the [USPTO] to impose reciprocal discipline." *See Persaud v. Director of the USPTO*, No. 1:16-cv-00495, 2017 WL 1147459, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2017). Further, a reciprocal discipline proceeding is "not an opportunity for an attorney to collaterally attack the findings or judgement of the original disciplining court." *See In re Hermina*, 907 A.2d 790, 799 (D.C. 2006). The standard under § 11.24(d)(1)(iii) is not met here.

Here, the stipulated sanction was within the range of appropriate discipline for the admitted misconduct, and Respondent's sanction "fits" Respondent's misconduct. The Washington State Bar Association and Respondent agreed that a 60-day suspension and probation for a period of 24 months beginning at the time of his reinstatement was appropriate. Stipulation, at 6 ¶ 30, 7 ¶ 32. The Stipulation reflects that the parties considered the applicable ABA Standards, the nature of the misconduct, and both aggravating and mitigating factors. *Id.* at 6 ¶ 25-29. The ABA Standards for his misconduct ranged from a reprimand to suspension. *Id.* at 6 ¶ 25-26. The applicable aggravating factors included "multiple offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law." *Id.* at 6 ¶ 27. Mitigating factors included "absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; and personal or emotional problems," as well as Respondent's willingness to resolve this matter at an early stage of the proceedings. *Id.* at 6 ¶¶ 28, 29.

Finally, there is no grave injustice because Respondent voluntarily agreed to the discipline in the Stipulation. *See In re Bruemmer*, Proceeding No. 2018-06, at 11 (USPTO Oct. 2, 2018) (there is no grave injustice in imposing reciprocal discipline when the underlying

discipline was voluntarily agreed to by the practitioner). His voluntary agreement to the Stipulation, in which he admitted the violations and agreed to a 60-day suspension, weighs against any claim that reciprocal discipline should not be imposed. Respondent cannot now evade reciprocal discipline on the basis of a "grave injustice." Any attempt by Respondent to relitigate the factual basis for the Washington discipline is inconsistent with the stipulation, his admissions, and his waiver of hearing and appeal rights.

Because Respondent's discipline is within the range of permissible penalties for his misconduct and he agreed to it in the Stipulation, he has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would be a grave injustice for him to receive reciprocal discipline by the USPTO Director.

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that reciprocal discipline should not be imposed. As a result, having failed to meet the burden, it is hereby determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact under 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(d) and Respondent's suspension from practice in patent, trademark, and other non-patent matters before the USPTO is the appropriate discipline.

ORDER

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby **ORDERED** that:

1. Respondent is suspended from the practice of patent, trademark, and other non-patent law before the USPTO for sixty (60) days commencing on the date of this Final Order;

2. The OED Director shall electronically publish the Final Order at OED's electronic FOIA Reading Room, which is publicly accessible at: https://foiadocuments.uspto.gov/oed;

3. The OED Director publish a notice in the *Official Gazette* materially consistent with the following:

Notice of Suspension

This notice concerns Alistair K. Chan of Bainbridge Island, Washington, who is a registered patent attorney (Registration Number 44,603) and an attorney licensed to practice law in Washington since October 23, 2019 (License No. 55568). In a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding, the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") has ordered that Mr. Chan be suspended for sixty (60) days from practice before the USPTO in patent, trademark, and other non-patent matters. Such discipline is imposed for Mr. Chan having violated 37 C.F.R. § 11.804(h), predicated upon being suspended from the practice of law by a duly constituted authority of a State.

On March 25, 2025, Mr. Chan agreed to a Stipulation to Suspension before the Disciplinary Board of the Washington State Bar Association regarding his representation of a patent application client before the USPTO, which, in part stated: (a) Mr. Chan was hired to file a patent application and charged the client $6,500 for such services; (b) the client paid the application fees that Mr. Chan had calculated were due; however, Mr. Chan miscalculated the fees, which resulted in an underpayment; (c) the USPTO notified Mr. Chan that it was withdrawing the application, but Mr. Chan did not notify the client of the withdrawal; (d) the client learned about the withdrawal, and Mr. Chan filed a request for rectification with the USPTO attempting to reinstate the client's application; (e) the USPTO denied the request for rectification. Mr. Chan did not respond to the client's requests for advice on how to proceed; (f) Mr. Chan believed that his representation of the client had ended after the USPTO denied the request for rectification, but he did not notify the client of the termination of the relationship; (g) because the client's patent application was withdrawn, Mr. Chan did not earn the attorney fee paid by the client for the representation; and (h) Mr. Chan has paid restitution in the amount of $12,681.00.

In the Stipulation to Suspension, Mr. Chan acknowledged that he: (a) failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client in violation of Washington State Rule of Professional Conduct ("RPC") 1.3; (b) failed to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information in violation of RPC 1.4(a) and (b); and (c) failed to give reasonable notice regarding termination of the representation and promptly refund unearned fees to the client in violation of RPC 1.16(d).

On May 16, 2025, the Disciplinary Board of the Washington State Bar Association filed the Stipulation to Suspension with the Supreme Court of Washington. On June 4, 2025, the Supreme Court of Washington suspended Mr. Chan for sixty (60) days in addition to other sanctions.

This action is taken pursuant to the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 32 and 37 C.F.R. § 11.24. Disciplinary decisions are available for public review at the Office of Enrollment and Discipline's FOIA Reading Room, located at: https://foiadocuments.uspto.gov/oed/;

4. The OED Director give notice of the public discipline, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.59, and the reasons for the discipline to disciplinary enforcement agencies in the state(s) where Respondent is admitted to practice, to courts where Respondent is known to be admitted, and to the public;

5. Respondent shall comply with the duties enumerated in 37 C.F.R. § 11.58;

6. Respondent is granted limited recognition pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.58(f) for thirty (30) days starting on the date of this Final Order so that Respondent may endeavor to conclude work on behalf of clients on any matters pending before the Office and, if such work cannot be concluded within such thirty (30) days, Respondent shall so advise each such client so that the client may make other arrangements;

7. Effective the date of the expiration of the 30-day period of limited recognition afforded to Respondent under 37 C.F.R. § 11.58(f), the USPTO is hereby authorized to disable or suspend any USPTO.gov accounts registered to Respondent as of the date of this Final Order (including, but not limited to, all accounts that Respondent has ever established, sponsored, or used in connection with any trademark or patent matter);

8. Respondent shall not apply for a USPTO verified Electronic System account, shall not obtain a USPTO verified Electronic System account, nor shall he have his name added to a USPTO verified Electronic System account, unless and until he is reinstated to practice

before the USPTO;

9. Immediately upon expiration of the 30-day period of limited recognition afforded to Respondent under § 11.58(f), Respondent is prohibited from using, assessing, or assisting others in using or accessing any USPTO.gov account(s) or other USPTO filing systems for preparing or filing documents with the USPTO;

10. Until a petition seeking Respondent's reinstatement to practice before the USPTO is granted pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.60, Respondent shall be prohibited, and the USPTO is authorized to disallow Respondent, from the following: (1) opening or activating any USPTO.gov account(s) to be used for preparing or filing documents with the USPTO; (2) applying for, or attempting to apply for any USPTO.gov account(s) to be used for preparing or filing documents with the USPTO; (3) verifying, or attempting to verify, any other person's credentials in connection with USPTO.gov account(s) to be used for preparing or filing documents with the USPTO; and (4) sponsoring or attempting to sponsor USPTO.gov account(s) to be used for preparing or filing documents with the USPTO; and

11. Nothing herein shall obligate the USPTO to take action, *sua sponte*, to re-activate any USPTO.gov account disabled or suspended pursuant to this order; rather, it is Respondent's sole responsibility to initiate any such re-activation of any such USPTO.gov account.

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.57(a), review of the final decision by the USPTO Director may be had by a Petition filed with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

under 35 U.S.C. § 32 "within 30 days after the date of the order recording the Director's action."

See E.D. Va. Local Civil Rule 83.5.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID SHEWCHUK

Digitally signed by DAVID SHEWCHUK
Date: 2026.07.13 10:43:58 -04'00'

Date

David Shewchuk
Acting General Counsel
United States Patent and Trademark Office

on delegated authority by

John A. Squires
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Final Order Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.24 was sent, on this day, to parties in the manner indicated below:

Via first-class certified mail, return receipt requested and regular first-class mail, to Respondent at the most recent address provided to the OED Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 11.11(a):

Mr. Alistair K Chan
Alistair Chan IP LLC
9769 NE Murden Cove Dr
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
Respondent

Via e-mail to the OED Director:

Sydney Johnson
[redacted]
Counsel for the OED Director

7/13/2026
Date

La Tonya Suggs
United States Patent and Trademark Office
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450